


Risk Assessment Form

UNDP Implementation Tool for the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

Decision-making Process
in Managing the Risks of Engagement
with the Security Sector

October 2017 (updated 2024)



Project Information and Overview

Country

Name

The completed questionnaire (in paper or electronic form) can be sent to the Deputy Director of the relevant RBx with copy to Crisis Bureau Deputy Director and Rule of Law, Security and Human Rights Team Leader and Human Rights Team Leader

Sign

Brief description of project or programme, including its objectives and the link with UNDP's strategic plan

Purpose of HRDDP assessment

Outline why the HRDDP is being carried out and the specific support envisaged to the non-UN security sector.

Short overview of human rights context

Include 1-2 paras on the current and recent (5 years) human rights context in the country and specifically whether there have been incidences of alleged grave or serious violations of human rights and 1 para on the situation of the non-UN security sector. General information could be gleaned from the GPRAF if one has been conducted. The GPRAF could also be added as an annex to the UNDP HRDDP assessment.

Prerequisites are meant to ensure the CO is mindful of the conditions needed prior to engaging in support to the security sector
If any of the prerequisites are not met, UNDP cannot enter into a programmatic commitment with the security sector

1. National ownership⁵

1.1 Has the host government (through the President, Prime Minister, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and / or UNDP’s counterpart ministry) submitted any form of request (direct requests from security forces will not be considered)?

- Yes
- No

1.2 Does the request pertain to a project or programme that is, or is eventually expected to be, integral to the national recovery or development strategy (for example Peacebuilding Plan, Security Sector Reform, National Police Reform, any currently existing National Action Plan for Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security etc)?

- Yes
- No

2. Alignment with UNDP recovery or development strategy

(including UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, Country Programme Document, etc)

2.1 Is the proposed intervention coherent with the rest of current / planned UNDP support in the country?

- Yes
- No

2.2 Are there other providers (UN and non-UN) that would be better suited for the proposed intervention?

- Yes
- No

- 2.3 Is the UNDP CO having or will the CO be recruiting the necessary technical resources to monitor the use and impact of the support provided during all of the programme cycle management phases (planning, managing, monitoring and evaluation)? For example, the presence / recruitment of a Chief Technical Advisor for the programmatic support (national and / or international)?

It is not advised that COs should engage in supporting the security sector through consultants only. The absence of technical capacity to the project increases severely the probability and the impact of the reputational risk since the CO may not be able to assess, monitor and respond to the risks identified in the project

Yes

No

3. Donor and other stakeholders support

- 3.1 Do donors and other stakeholders supporting or partnering in the project or programme (including, when relevant, other UN agencies and the Peacebuilding Fund) have major objections to the programmatic engagement? Endorsement is to be achieved through the appropriate decision-making forum (LPAC, etc).

Support to the security sector in a fragile / crisis setting may generate initial skepticism among civil society representatives. In that case, the CO can take steps to communicate and explain the rationale for support clearly outlining how this support will address the needs of target populations

Yes

No

4. Objective of the programme

- 4.1 If you are engaged in supporting the security sector, is the ultimate goal of the programme to contribute to sustainable development, through capacity development?⁶

If your engagement with the security sector aims at contributing to a humanitarian response and is very limited in time, please skip this question

Yes

No

5. Nature of the goods and services that are to be provided as part of the programme

5.1 Does the nature of the goods or services improve military / defence forces' combat capacities, or in any way threaten states' security or the security of the civilian population?⁷

Yes

No

5.2 Does the request entail purchase of lethal or non-lethal weapons, military combat equipment and military tactical communications equipment?⁸

Yes

No

5.3 Does support for the intelligence services form part of an integrated approach to the security sector and aim to improve oversight or accountability of the intelligence services?⁹

Yes

No

Pls complete if initiative includes support to intelligence services.
If not, please skip question.

To meet the prerequisites the answers to the above questions should be:

1.1 —————> Yes
1.2 —————> Yes
2.1 —————> Yes
2.2 —————> No
2.3 —————> Yes
3.1 —————> No
4.1 —————> Yes
5.1 —————> No
5.2 —————> No
5.3 —————> Yes

If answers differ from the above the necessary prerequisites for engagement have not been met.

Factors of risk to consider for decision-making

Country situation		Probability		Impact		Total
1. Does the country situation allow the programme or project to be under national implementation (NIM)?*	<input type="radio"/> Yes	4	→	⊗ 4	→	⊖ 16
	<input type="radio"/> No	3	→	⊗ 5	→	⊖ 15

Rationale

YES ↓


Probability

The probability of risk is lower in programmes/projects under DIM implementation. UNDP has better control over the activities of the national partners in such situations.

Impact

The responsibility factor is high for UNDP in both situations. UNDP considers the impact of risk as higher for DIM projects and severe in this situation. Under national implementation modality (NIM) the responsible party is the national partners. But the corporate risk for UNDP is as high as under DIM modality.

NIM does not mean that the corporate risk for UNDP is by definition lower than when UNDP is an implementing partner, since these nuances are difficult to explain to external stakeholders. The same applies for funds whose management does not lie with UNDP (for example: activities with military/defense forces approved and implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund or other trust funds).



* UNDP CO should always escalate the decision to Regional Bureaux in case of envisaged DIM projects engaging security forces

Country situation

Probability

Impact

Total

2. Did the CO recruit / does the CO have the necessary technical resources to monitor the use and impact of the support provided during all the programme cycle management phases: planning, implementing and managing, monitoring and evaluation. (This could include the presence or recruitment of a (Chief) Technical Advisor for programmatic support?)

Yes

No

1



⊗

1



⊖

1

5




⊗

3



⊖

15



Rationale


NO

Probability

The absence of technical staff to the project increases severely the probability of the reputational risk since the CO may not be able to assess, monitor and respond to risks in the project.

Impact

The absence of technical staff to the project increases substantially the impact of the reputational risk since the CO may not be able to assess, monitor and respond to risks in the project.



Country situation		Probability		Impact		Total
3. Is the country under any “state of emergency” and/or any form of international (UN or regional organization) sanction?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	2	→	⊗ 5	→	⊖ 10
	<input type="radio"/> No	1	→	⊗ 1	→	⊖ 1

Rationale


Probability

The fact that a country is under any form of international sanction increases importantly the probability of the reputational risk. The existence of sanctions indicates the country situation is not respecting existing international commitments and standards. In such situations the Rule of Law may be at risk and there may be a greater risk of grave human rights violations.

Impact

The fact that a country is under any form of international sanction and/or state of emergency increases importantly the impact of the reputational risk for UNDP. A country under any form of international sanction may seek to develop and / or maintain relationships with the United Nations for political reasons. In such contexts, United Nations and UNDP will be under deep scrutiny by the international community.

The existence of a state of emergency means that rights and freedoms may be suspended (all rights that can be derogated are listed in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights). For example, a government can detain individuals and hold them without trial in certain limited circumstances. The absence of state of emergency does not mean an absence of risk.



4. Are there functioning national and civilian oversight mechanisms of the security (police / gendarmerie / defense) forces (UNDP CO should always escalate the decision to headquarters in case there is no civilian oversight / elected government)?

Yes

No

1

→ ⊗

1

→ =

1


2

→ ⊗

5

→ =

10



Definition

→ **Functioning oversight mechanism** means that (i) such mechanisms are not only existing in legislation / regulations but have an administrative existence with reports and other being produced for civilian authorities; (ii) where there is an alleged breach of criminal, civil or human rights law, individual

or corporate responsibility can be investigated and determined in a transparent process consistent with human rights standards; (iii) ombudsperson or National Human Rights Institutions or National Preventive Mechanisms carry out investigations, issue recommendations and draft monitoring reports.

→ **Oversight** includes internal (inspections, etc) and external (parliament, judiciary, etc) type of mechanisms.




Rationale

Probability

The existence of functional national and civilian oversight mechanisms does not mean that there are no risks related to the security forces and consequently to UNDP support. The absence of a functional national and civilian oversight mechanism increases the probability of the reputational risk. The absence of functioning oversight structures opens the door to grave human rights violations to occur and multiply since in such contexts, security institutions may have no civilian accountability framework.

Impact

The existence of functional national and civilian oversight mechanisms does not mean that there are no risks related to the security forces and consequently to UNDP support. The absence of functional national and civilian oversight mechanisms can have an important impact on the reputational risk of UNDP. In such situations, the security forces operate without a strong accountability framework to civilian authorities, leaving the door open for grave violations of human rights to occur with impunity (the absence of such a framework blurs the line between the gravity of human rights violations with a possible “no limits” perception). This is especially the case in countries without elected government or in political transition. In such situations, the chain of command may be even looser and the authority of civilian leaders (traditional UNDP interlocutors) on the security forces may be challenged or absent.



5. Are national policies or ongoing processes to reform / support the security sector participatory, inclusive, non-discriminatory and people-centered?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	1 → ⊗ 1 → ⊖ 1	
	<input type="radio"/> No	4 → ⊗ 2 → ⊖ 8	

Definition

Participatory, inclusive and people-centered means that support to the security sector should follow the human rights-based approach and support confidence-building measures between civil society including women’s organizations and the security sector. In the case of the security sector, such an approach should

ensure that (i) civilians (including both men and women) are part of security sector reform process and production of national security policies and strategies and at the center of any type of support to the security sector; (ii) the reform of the security sector aims at providing improved security services to the population (taking

into consideration the specific security needs of women and men), including to marginalized groups (including women, minorities, rural and urban populations, children, persons with disabilities, LGBTI minority populations etc); (iii) public outreach activities such as public perception surveys are carried out.




Rationale

Probability

The absence of participatory, inclusive, non-discriminatory and people-centered national policies / processes to reform the security sector is an indicator of a lack of understanding and possible interest from national authorities / relevant ministries of what Security sector reform (SSR) entails. It also indicates a weak civilian accountability framework. Such an absence increases the probability of grave human rights violations happening.

Impact

The existence of participatory, inclusive and people-centered national policies / processes to reform the security sector can have an important impact on the accountability framework. Their absence does not increase much the reputational risk since national policies / ongoing processes are unfortunately rarely participatory, inclusive and people-centered (baseline is low).



Intended Recipients Situation

Country situation		Probability		Impact		Total
6. Is / are the intended recipient(s) accused of grave human rights violations including any specific record of violations?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	5	→ ⊗	2	→ =	10
	<input type="radio"/> No	1	→ ⊗	1	→ =	1

Note

UNDP does not have a monitoring mandate in the area of human rights. Information on the record of the intended recipient with regard to compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law are made available by OHCHR and human rights components of peace-keeping operations (PKO) and special political (SP) missions and other reliable sources. UNDP CO may also consult existing human resources in the RCO such as Peace and Development Advisors (PDA) and Human Rights Advisors (HRA) – it is important to keep in mind that neither PDAs or HRAs have a monitoring role.

Sources of information relating to human rights violations include:

→ Reports produced by the Country Office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights or by the Human Rights Component of peacekeeping missions or special political missions as well as various types of reports of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council (HRC). These reports may be public or not.

→ Reports of UN Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures
 → Reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council on peacekeeping operations
 → Reports of other UN mechanisms or agencies (Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on children and armed conflicts, Special Representatives on Children in Armed Conflicts and Sexual Violence in Conflict, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA)
 → Reports of UN commissions of inquiry
 → Decisions and reports of UN treaty bodies including on individual cases
 → Reports from Joint Mission Analysis Cells in peacekeeping operations

Other sources include, but are not limited to: International or regional organizations (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, European Union, African Union)

→ Reports from National Human Rights Institutions such as commissions or ombudsman offices or National Preventive Mechanisms
 → Reports from international non-governmental organizations (International Crisis Group, International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, etc.)
 → Reports from local non-governmental organizations
 → Information emanating from the intended recipient security forces or governmental sources
 → Media reports

Rationale

Probability

When the recipient(s) is / are accused of grave human rights violations including any specific record of violations, the probability of grave human rights violations is increased and the reputational risk for UNDP is severe. Such situation reflects a general lack of accountability within the security forces that open the doors to further grave human rights violations.

Such elements may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and is therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.

Impact

When the recipient(s) is / are accused of grave human rights violations including any specific record of violations, the impact on the reputational risk for UNDP is high. The overall country situation is usually understood by international partners as very challenging, including for UNDP. In such situations strong mitigation measures are extremely important in order to demonstrate that UNDP works to change such situations.

Country situation		Probability		Impact		Total
7. Is / are recipient(s) taking effective steps to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	1	→	⊗ 1	→	= 1
	<input type="radio"/> No	5	→	⊗ 3	→	= 15

Rationale

Probability

In those cases where the recipient(s) is taking effective steps to hold perpetrators accountable of any grave human rights violations, the risk is low but needs to be monitored. It is important to ensure those steps eventually bring results.


When the recipient(s) does not take effective steps to hold perpetrators accountable of any grave human rights violations, the probability of the reputational risk for UNDP increases importantly. Such a situation means national partners are not able and / or willing to make the security forces accountable for their deeds. It also could mean that national partners may not pay attention to international stakeholders, including UNDP (weak leverage from international partners, including UNDP, on national partners to respond to such grave human rights violations).

Such elements may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and are therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.

Impact

In those cases where the recipient(s) is taking effective steps to hold perpetrators accountable of any grave human rights violations, the impact on the reputational risk is low but needs to be monitored. It is important to ensure those steps bring results.

When the recipient(s) does not take effective steps to hold perpetrators accountable of any grave human rights violations, the impact on the reputational risk is substantial. It opens the door for grave human rights violations to occur or remain unaddressed.



8. Are corrective measures being taken or institutions, protocols or procedures put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations?

Yes

No

1 →

5 →

1 →

⊗ 3 →

Go to question 9

Go to question 10 → ⊖ 15

Rationale

Probability

When the recipient(s) does not take corrective measures or institutions, protocols or procedures are not put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations, the probability of the reputational risk for UNDP increases. Such a situation means national partners are not able and / or willing to make the security forces accountable for their deeds. It also could mean that national partners may not pay attention to international stakeholders, including UNDP (weak leverage from international partners, including UNDP, on national partners to respond to such grave human rights violations).

Such elements may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and are therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.

Impact

When the recipient(s) does not take corrective measures or institutions, protocols or procedures are not put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations, the probability of the reputational risk for UNDP is severe. Such a situation means national partners are not able and / or willing to make the security forces accountable for their actions in the medium and long-term. It also could mean that national partners may not pay attention to international stakeholders, including UNDP (weak leverage from international partners, including UNDP, on national partners to respond to such grave human rights violations).

Country situation		Probability		Impact		Total
9. Are the corrective measures to hold any future perpetrators accountable adequate?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	1	→	⊗ 1	→	= 1
	<input type="radio"/> No	5	→	⊗ 3	→	= 15

Definition

Adequate means that the corrective measures enable the prevention of a recurrence of such violations.



Rationale

Probability

In those cases where corrective measures are being taken or institutions, protocols or procedures are put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations, the probability of the reputational risk is low but needs to be monitored. It is important to ensure those steps bring results.


In a situation where corrective measures to hold any future perpetrators accountable are not adequate, the probability of renewed violations is high since existing measures / mechanisms are not efficient. Such inefficiency may also indicate weak capacity and / or insufficient willingness of national partners to avoid such violations to occur.

Such elements may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and is therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.

Impact

In those cases where corrective measures are being taken or institutions, protocols or procedures put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations, the probability of the reputational risk is low but needs to be monitored. It is important to ensure those steps bring eventual results.

In a situation where corrective measures to hold any future perpetrators accountable are not adequate, the impact of renewed violations on UNDP's reputational risk is substantial since existing measures / mechanisms are not efficient. Such inefficiency may also indicate weak capacity and / or insufficient willingness of national partners to avoid such violations to occur.



Security Forces Situation

Country situation		Probability		Impact		Total
10. Are security forces engaged in armed conflicts (currently or have they been within the last year)?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	5	→	⊗ 3	→	= 15
	<input type="radio"/> No	1	→	⊗ 1	→	= 1


Rationale

Probability

In a situation where security forces play an active part in armed conflicts, the probability of renewed violations is severe. In crisis-affected situations the Rule of Law is profoundly undermined, and injustice and insecurity are allowed to flourish. When security forces play an active part in an armed conflict, internal and external accountability mechanisms are not properly functioning while civilian oversight is undermined. In countries immersed in armed conflict, the population, and especially marginalized groups such as women and children are more likely to be subjected to grave human rights violations.

Impact

In countries where security forces play an active part in armed conflicts, there is an understanding that operating in such contexts is challenging for the United Nations and that any support from UNDP aims precisely to improve the governance of the security sector.




Country situation

Probability

Impact

Total

11. Do security forces commit (or have they committed within the last year) grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law?	<input type="radio"/> Yes	5 → ⊗ 3 → ⊖ 15	
	<input type="radio"/> No	1 → ⊗ 1 → ⊖ 1	

Rationale

Probability

In a situation where security forces play an active part in grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law the probability of renewed violations is severe.


Such elements may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and is therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.

Impact

In a situation where security forces play an active part in grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law the probability of renewed violations is substantial.

Note

UNDP CO should always escalate the decision to headquarters in case the security forces commit (or have committed within the last year) grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.



Country situation

Probability

Impact

Total

12. Can UNDP be accused of enabling military / security operations or indirectly supporting grave human rights violations against the civilian population or neighboring countries?

Yes

No

5



⊗

5



⊖

25

1




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
Rationale

Probability

In a situation where UNDP can be accused of enabling military / security operations or indirectly supporting or enhancing violent actions against the civilian population or neighboring countries the probability of UNDP to be affected is severe.

Impact

In a situation where UNDP can be accused of enabling military / security operations or indirectly supporting or enhancing violent actions against the civilian population or neighboring countries the impact on the reputational risk of UNDP is severe.



Total

Mitigatory Measures Calculation Table

The maximum number of points for mitigatory measures initiated but not yet fully in place is 25% of the total points. This includes if the necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support are in place or in the process of being recruited.

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
<p>1. Does the country situation allow the programme or project to be under national implementation (NIM)?</p>					
<p>2. Did the Country Office recruit / does the CO have the necessary technical resources to monitor the use and impact of the support provided during all the programme cycle management phases, planning, implementing and managing, monitoring and evaluation. (This could include the presence or recruitment of a (Chief) Technical Advisor for programmatic support?)</p>	<p><input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 5</p>	<p><input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No</p>	<p><input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No</p>		

Justification. The existence of a project / programme to support the security sector in countries where UNDP operates carries an intrinsic risk that can be properly managed only with the necessary technical resources in the Country Office.

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
3. Is the country under any “state of emergency” and / or any form of international (UN or regional organization) sanction?	<input type="radio"/> A1 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> C2 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> C3 → Points 1	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>

Justification. The existence of international sanctions increases importantly the probability of reputational risk and requires a solid analysis of the political dimension of the support to the security sector, including a human rights and a stakeholders’ analysis of the sector; it also requires a good planning of the support to the sector. Necessary technical resources are required to monitor the use and impact of support.

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
4. Are there functional and effective national and civilian oversight mechanisms of the security (police / gendarmerie / defense) forces (UNDP CO should always escalate the decision to headquarters in case there is no civilian oversight / elected government)?	<input type="radio"/> A2 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A3 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> A4 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> B2 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> B3 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> B4 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 1	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>

Justification. In a country where oversight mechanisms of the security sector are not functioning, priority should go to reinforce both the internal and external control mechanisms. The presence of necessary technical resources to monitor the use and impact of support is required.

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
5. Are national policies or ongoing processes to reform / support the security sector participatory, inclusive, non-discriminatory and people-centered?	<input type="radio"/> B1 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> B3 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> B4 → Points 2	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>

Justification. In order to have national policies and SSR to be participatory, inclusive processes and people-centered, specific measures enabling the identification of such needs (perception surveys, etc) and activities to make such participation happen are necessary.

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
6. Is / are the intended recipient(s) accused of grave human rights violations including any specific record of violations?	<input type="radio"/> A1 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A2 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A3 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> C2 → Points 1	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No		

Justification. When members of the security forces are accused of grave human rights violations, programmatic support should target institutional reforms of the security institutions, in order to promote / support systemic changes; but also external oversight institutions to ensure that such violations are being identified and responded to at the national level. Any work on SOP and internal procedures should be linked to institutional reforms; to support sustainable change. A human rights-based analysis should be undertaken with the support of the necessary technical resources in order for UNDP to have its own assessment of the situation and be able to respond to it programmatically. Gender related concerns should be an integral part of this analysis.

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
7. Is / are recipient(s) taking effective steps to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable?	<input type="radio"/> A1 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A2 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A3 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A4 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> C2 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D1 → Points 5	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No		

Justification. When members of the security forces are accused of grave human rights violations, programmatic support should target institutional reforms of the security institutions, in order to promote / support systemic changes; but also external oversight institutions to ensure that such violations are being identified and responded to at the national level. In addition to this work, there is also a need to support specific SOP and internal procedures enabling institutions to respond to cases of graves human rights violations committed by the security forces through internal disciplinary mechanisms. Necessary technical resources are required to monitor the use and impact of support.

In such a situation, an official communication by the CO to the security institutions could be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable (corrective)

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
8. Are corrective measures being taken or institutions, protocols or procedures put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations?	<input type="radio"/> A1 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A2 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A3 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> A4 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> C2 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D1 → Points 5	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No		

Justification. When members of the security forces are accused of grave human rights violations, programmatic support should target institutional reforms of the security institutions, in order to promote / support systemic changes; but also external oversight institutions to ensure that such violations are being identified and responded to at the national level. In addition to this work, there is also a need to support specific SOP and internal procedures enabling institutions to respond to cases of grave human rights violations committed by the security forces through internal disciplinary mechanisms. An analysis of the origins of failure to hold future perpetrators accountable should be produced and programmatic response designed accordingly. Necessary technical resources are required to monitor the use and impact of support.

In such situations, an official communication by the CO to the security institutions could be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable (corrective)

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
9. Are the corrective measures to hold any future perpetrators accountable adequate?	<input type="radio"/> A1 → Points 4 <input type="radio"/> A2 → Points 3 <input type="radio"/> A3 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> A4 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> B2 → Points 3 <input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> C3 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D1 Points 5	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No		

Justification. When members of the security forces are accused of grave human rights violations, programmatic support should target institutional reforms of the security institutions, in order to get systemic changes; but also external oversight institutions to ensure that such violations are being identified and responded to at the national level. In addition to this work, there is also a need to support specific SOP and internal procedures enabling institutions to respond to cases of graves human rights violations committed by the security forces through internal disciplinary mechanisms. An analysis of the origins of failure to hold future perpetrators accountable should be produced and programmatic response designed accordingly. Necessary technical resources are required to monitor the use and impact of support.

Measures to support the judiciary to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of grave human rights violations by security forces should be taken.

In such a situation, an official communication by the CO to the security institutions could be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable (corrective).

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
10. Are security forces engaged in armed conflicts (currently or have they been within the last year)?	<input type="radio"/> A1 → Points 3 <input type="radio"/> A2 → Points 3 <input type="radio"/> B1 → Points 4 <input type="radio"/> B3 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> B4 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D1 → Points 5	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>

Justification. In a country where security forces are engaged in armed conflicts, UNDP should engage only in reforms that seek to improve the accountability of security institutions and strengthen civilian control over those institutions. Likewise, UNDP should develop a programmatic engagement that engages heavily with the population and support to the populations' protection needs. Necessary technical resources are required to monitor the use and impact of support.

In such a situation: (i) an official communication by the CO to the security institutions should be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable; (ii) UNDP could limit its support through an official correspondence to the departments of the institution that do not have staff accused of grave human rights violations (corrective).

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
11. Do security forces commit (or have they committed within the last year) grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law?	<input type="radio"/> A1 → Points 4 <input type="radio"/> A2 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> B1 → Points 2 <input type="radio"/> B2 → Points 4 <input type="radio"/> B3 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> B4 → Points 1 <input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D1 → Points 5	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>

Justification. In a country where security forces are engaged in armed conflicts, UNDP should engage only in reforms that seek to improve the accountability of security institutions and strengthen civilian control over those institutions. Likewise, UNDP should develop a programmatic engagement that engages heavily with the population and support to the population protection needs, ensuring that both women’s and men’s security needs are taken into account. Such work can take place only with the necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support.

In such a situation: (i) an official communication by the CO to the security institutions should be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable; (ii) UNDP could limit its support through an official correspondence to the departments of the institution that do not have staff accused of grave human rights violations (corrective).

Risk factor	Mitigatory Measure and points	Planned 25% of points	Implemented	Points by mitigatory measure	Points by risk factor → table 3
12. Can UNDP be accused of enabling military / security operations or indirectly supporting grave human rights violations against the civilian population or neighboring countries?	<input type="radio"/> C1 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D1 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D2 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D3 → Points 5 <input type="radio"/> Corrective D4 → Points 5	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>	<div style="background-color: #e0e0e0; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>

Justification. In a situation where UNDP can be accused of enabling military / security operations or indirectly supporting grave human rights violations against the civilian population or neighboring countries, the Country Office needs to have a Chief Technical Advisor able to advise the senior management of the country office. No programmatic support can mitigate such a situation that must be addressed at political level with the support of necessary resources / capacities.


In such a situation: (i) an official communication by the CO to the security institutions should be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable; (ii) UNDP should suspend its support to the security sector at large through an official correspondence (corrective).

Totals		
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No. of points from calculation of risk factors

No. of points from calculation of mitigatory measures

Total risk assessment score after taking into account mitigatory measures



Definition of Reputational Risks from the HRDDP perspective



Highly likely to Expected

Points **126 - 154** Level of risk **5** → **Expected**

Points **125 - 105** Level of risk **4** → **Highly likely**

Likely

Points **104 - 49** Level of risk **3** → **Likely**

Not likely to Moderately Likely

Points **48 - 26** Level of risk **2** → **Moderately likely**

Points **25** Level of risk **1** → **Not likely**

Results & Example



Example CAR	No. of points from calculation of risk factors	No. of points from calculation of mitigatory measures	Total risk assessment score after taking into account mitigatory measures
Country Situation July 2013	153	0	148
Country Situation July 2014	128	26	102
Country Situation April 2015	106	58	48
Country Situation January 2017	97	58	39

