



UNDP Implementation Tool for the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

Decision-making Process in Managing the Risks of Engagement
with the Security Sector

October 2017 (updated 2020)

Introduction

Background:

The *Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces* (HRDDP) was issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 13 July 2011. The HRDDP applies to UNDP and all UN entities providing support to non-UN security forces, whether in peacekeeping operations, special political missions, or non-mission situations with the presence of UN Country Teams (UNCTs).¹

The HRDDP can be understood as a risk management mechanism aimed at ensuring the Organization or its personnel does not provide support to entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law (“grave violations”) when engaging with the security sector *[such engagement can include support to the police, gendarmerie, military, oversight bodies, prisons in countries where those are managed by the Ministry of Interior, and any unit, department or office related to the security forces]*. A ‘grave violation’ includes commission of war crimes or of crimes against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or ‘gross violations’ of human rights, including summary executions and extrajudicial killings, acts of torture, enforced disappearances, enslavement, rape and sexual violence of a comparable serious nature, or acts of *refoulement* under refugee law that are committed on a significant scale or with a significant degree of frequency (that is, they are more than isolated or merely sporadic phenomena); or constitute a pattern of repeated violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law committed by a significant number of members of the unit.²

Due diligence means: (1) doing a risk assessment before giving support, (2) being transparent with national partners about the legally binding nature and core principles governing provision of UN support and (3) ensuring an effective implementation framework. The HRDDP does not bring a new set of obligations. UNDP should already operate within the framework defined by the Policy. Nevertheless, the Policy requires UNDP to ensure risks are assessed and managed at every stage of its programmatic engagement with the security sector. It also outlines certain actions that should be taken by the UN system in certain contexts.

Objectives of the Implementation Tool:

¹ Paras 20 and 21 of the HRDDP: “Implementation of the HRDDP must take into account the specific mandates of the UN entity concerned, as well as the nature and extent of the support, and the political and operational context in which it is delivered” (Para 20); “Each UN entity providing support must develop an implementation framework in accordance with its management practices in order to ensure compliance with this policy. That framework should be clearly set out in a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) or similar instrument [...]”

² The HRDDP focuses on grave violations committed by a unit or by “civilians or military authorities that are directly responsible for the management, administration or command of non-UN security forces” – Para 7 and Para 12 of the HRDDP.

The overall objective of the Implementation Tool is to enable UNDP managers to make risk-informed decisions when entering into a programmatic commitment with the security sector and provide a framework for the implementation of the policy.

The specific objectives of the Implementation Tool are to outline key elements of the due diligence:

- (i) challenges and opportunities to engage in supporting the security sector;
- (ii) prerequisites for UNDP to engage into the security sector;
- (iii) criteria for UNDP Country Offices and Headquarters to assess the corporate risk and handle new requests for programmatic involvement with the security sector;
- (iv) possible management responses;
- (v) procedures for communication with the relevant authorities;
- (vi) procedures to report; and
- (vii) applicability.


Accountability Framework for the Implementation of the HRDDP:

UNDP considers the HRDDP as a risk management mechanism and planning tool (the HRDDP should not be understood as a vetting tool). UNDP developed its implementation framework within existing risk management mechanisms such as the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) system and the Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP).

The implementation of the policy follows existing UNDP accountability frameworks at the Country Office (CO) and Headquarter (HQ) levels accordingly for organizational, programmatic and staff accountability - see Flow chart for Accountability Framework. At CO level, this means the framework for implementation should be designed by the technical staff of the project, reviewed by the Programme Manager (quality assurance) and cleared by the Senior Management of the CO. The staff of the project is expected to execute the implementation framework of the HRDDP under the general supervision of the most senior official of the CO and the direct supervision of the Programme Manager.

The accountability framework consists of (1) a questionnaire on pre-requisites; (2) a questionnaire assessing the reputational risk for the UNDP when entering the sector; and, (3) measures aimed at mitigating the risks identified.

Procedural Flowchart



1. Challenges and Opportunities

In responding to a request, UNDP will consider the following challenges and opportunities³

Challenges	Opportunities
Since security forces can play an active part in armed conflicts and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, uninformed support to those actors may be politically sensitive and inconsistent with UN standards and principles.	Supporting governments in the security sector (including procurement of goods and services for security forces) in post-conflict situations can contribute to mitigate conflict and prevent violence. For instance, an improvement in the living conditions of the military can contribute to reduce tensions, create opportunities for dialogue and peacebuilding and provide entry points to work on the democratic governance of the sector (eventual goal of any programmatic engagement in the sector).
UNDP can be accused of enabling military/security operations or accused of indirect support to enhance violent actions against the civilian population or neighboring countries. It can be argued that irrespective of the nature of the programmatic engagement, the security forces will benefit from reinforcement of their operational capacity.	Requests for support may provide opportunities to strengthen the governance of security institutions (improve management capacities of civil authorities and oversight of the security sector). This, in turn, will enable support to improve democratic governance of security institutions, which is critical to restore the rule of law, and prevent instability, human rights abuses and disruption of democratic processes.

The experience of UNDP in supporting the security sector in more than 20 countries in crisis-affected and fragile situations the past few years demonstrates that such support may look like a risky enterprise at first glance since reputational risks are high; but can be proved to be a strategic contribution to sustaining peace and democracy.

2. Prerequisites

When a request for UNDP involvement in a project or programme dealing with security forces is received, the country office verifies if the prerequisites are met using the criteria and risk assessment template in this tool and the ERM system before project or programme documents or cost-sharing agreements are signed. The Resident Representative (RR) consults with the UN Country Team, and with the

³ Table from the *Decision-making Process, Managing the risks of engagement with military/defense forces* (UNDP, 2009)

SRSG/DSRSG/RSG if applicable⁴. If any of the prerequisites are not met, UNDP cannot enter into a programmatic commitment with the security sector.

When activities with security forces are approved and implemented, for instance under the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) or other trust funds, the management of the programmes does not always lie with UNDP. However, this does not mean that the corporate risk for UNDP is by definition lower than when UNDP is an implementing partner, since these nuances are difficult to explain to external stakeholders. For that reason, UNDP CO needs to respond to prerequisites and ensure the risk assessment is done for programmes/projects/activities for which UNDP is only Administrative Agent as well.

Country		
Name of RR or Deputy RR who will sign off <i>[either completing the questionnaire in paper or electronically sending the questionnaire is sent to the Deputy Director of the relevant RBx with copy to Crisis Bureau Deputy Director and Rule of Law, Security and Human Rights Team Leader]</i>		
Brief description of project or programme, including its objectives and the link with UNDP's strategic plan		
Description of request – Purpose		

Prerequisites <i>[prerequisites are meant to ensure the CO is mindful of necessary steps prior to engaging in support to the security sector] [If any of the prerequisites are not met, UNDP cannot enter into a programmatic commitment with the security sector [window to pop-up]].</i>	Answer (yes or no)	Describe how the request meets the prerequisite

⁴ Increasingly UNCTs are completing General Preliminary Risk Assessment Frameworks (GPRAFs) as overall risk profiles of the security sector for UNCTs which can be beneficial to UNDP and the UNCT to understand the overall risk profile of the security sector in country, including for Common Country Analysis (CCAs). However, the GPRAF or another common risk assessment of the non-UN security sector is not a replacement for the need for UNDP to undergo a specific risk assessment for UNDP interventions pursuant to the Policy. The HRDDP specifically requires each UN entity providing support to develop an implementation framework in accordance with its management practices, that the UN entity 'directly concerned' should conduct an assessment of the potential risks and benefits involved in providing support, and that implementation must take into account the specific mandates of the UN entity involved. Paras 21, 14 and 20. Whilst accountability for implementation of the policy lies with individual entities, coordination across the UN is required to promote consistency across the UN in-country with the most Senior United Nations official kept informed and promoting coordination. Para 19.

<p>1. National ownership⁵</p> <p>1.1. Has the host government (through the President, Prime Minister, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and/or UNDP’s counterpart ministry) submitted any form of request (direct requests from security forces will not be considered)?</p> <p>1.2. Does the request pertain to a project or programme that is, or is eventually expected to be, integral to the national recovery or development strategy (for example Peacebuilding Plan, Security Sector Reform, National Police Reform, any currently existing National Action Plan for Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security’etc)?</p>		
<p>2. Alignment with UNDP recovery or development strategy (including UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework , Country Programme Document, etc)</p> <p>2.1. Is the proposed intervention coherent with the rest of current/planned UNDP support in the country?</p> <p>2.2. Are there other providers (UN and non-UN) that would be better suited for the proposed intervention?</p> <p>2.3. Is the UNDP CO having or will the CO be recruiting the necessary technical resources to monitor the use and impact of the support provided during all of the programme cycle management phases (planning, managing, monitoring and evaluation)? For example, the presence/recruitment of a (Chief) Technical Advisor for the programmatic support (national and/or international)? <i>[It is not advised that COs should engage in supporting the security sector through consultants only. The absence of technical staff to the project increases severely the probability and the impact of the reputational risk since the CO won’t be able to assess, monitor and respond to the risks identified in the project]</i></p>		

⁵ Cf. UNDP Strategic Plan and The UNDP Accountability System, Accountability framework and oversight policy (2008), DP/2008/16/Rev.1

<p>3. Donor and other stakeholders support</p> <p>Do donors and other stakeholders supporting or partnering in the project or programme (including, when relevant, other UN agencies and the Peacebuilding Fund) have major objections to the programmatic engagement? Endorsement is to be achieved through the appropriate decision-making forum (LPAC, etc).</p> <p><i>[Support to the security sector in a fragile/crisis setting may generate initial skepticism among civil society representatives. In that case, the CO can take steps to communicate and explain the rationale for support clearly outlining how this support will address the needs of target populations]</i></p>		
<p>4. Objective of the programme</p> <p>If you are engaged in supporting the security sector, is the ultimate goal of the programme to contribute to the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic governance, through capacity development?⁶</p> <p><i>[If your engagement with the security sector aims at contributing to a humanitarian response and is very limited in time, please skip this question]</i></p>		
<p>5. Nature of the goods and services that are to be provided as part of the programme</p> <p>5.1. Does the nature of the goods or services improve military/defence forces' combat capacities, or in any way threaten states' security or civilian population?⁷</p> <p>5.2. Does the request entail purchase of lethal or non-lethal weapons, combat equipment, or tactical communications equipment?⁸</p>		

⁶ Cf. UNDP Concept Note "Supporting Democratic Governance of Security Institutions" for more information.

⁷ In case of doubt on how to interpret the nature of the goods, guidance can be found at OECD/DAC Statistical Reporting Directives, DCD/DAC(2007)34, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/62/38429349.pdf>

⁸ "There are some areas of security sector reform in which the United Nations would not normally be involved, such as the provision of military armaments and other equipment [...]".SG Report *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform* (2008) A/62/659-S/2008/39

5.3. Does the request include the reform of the intelligence services? ⁹		
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3. Risk-assessment & Criteria for Decision-making

A risk assessment shall take place at the earliest stages of engagement, in the planning stages with the security sector, before project documents or cost-sharing agreements are signed, and thus preferably before project implementation – including procurement – is initiated. The risk assessment is comprised of an analysis of eleven criteria. The risk assessment is part of the ERM system. The objective of the assessment is to provide a baseline analysis of risks for engaging with the sector. When doing the assessment, it is important to keep in mind the dynamic nature of security.

Programmatic involvement with security forces, including possible procurement of goods and services, is considered to have a low corporate risk for UNDP if all the criteria below are met. The risks should be analysed and management responses given within the present model prior to any engagement in the sector. Atlas Project Risk Logs and the Enterprise Risk Management system (ERM) should be used as a way of documenting the analysis by the RR behind the decision making process.¹⁰ If the risk is medium or high, the UNDP Country Offices should escalate the issue of management of the risk to the Regional Bureau, using the ERM system. UNDP CO should always escalate the decision to headquarters in case of envisaged DIM projects engaging security forces. Implications of a misjudgment in these matters can have repercussions on UNDP’s corporate credibility and image beyond the country level. A range of mitigation measures are proposed at the end of the questionnaire.

⁹ “There are some areas of security sector reform in which the United Nations would not normally be involved, such as [...]the reform of intelligence services”. SG Report *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform*, (2008) A/62/659–S/2008/39

¹⁰ Atlas Project Risk Logs enables to identify and manage risks at the project level. ERM Unit risk management builds upon this process by capturing broader risks that go beyond the project level and affect the overall objectives of a Unit. Considering any support to the security sector is by definition sensitive, risk identification/assessment should go beyond the project level and include risks affecting the Unit through the ERM policy.

REPUTATIONAL RISK				
Factors of risk to consider for decision-making				
Country situation	YES/NO	Probability	Impact	Total
1. Does the country situation allow the programme or project to be under national implementation (NIM)? ¹¹	YES NO	4 3	4 5	16 15
<i>Rationale</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>The probability of a risk is lower is programmes/project under DIM implementation. UNDP has a better control over the activities of the national partners in such situations.</i>	<i>The responsibility factor is high for UNDP in both situations. UNDP considers the impact of risk as higher for DIM project (cf. Document Managing the risks of engagement with military/defense forces) and severe in this situation. Under NIM the responsible party is the national partners. But the corporate risk for UNDP is as high as under DIM modality.</i> <i>NIM does not mean that the corporate risk for UNDP is by definition lower than when UNDP is an implementing partner, since these nuances are difficult to explain to external stakeholders. The same applies for funds whose management does not lie with UNDP (for example: activities with military/defense forces approved and implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund or other trust funds).</i>	
2. Did the Country Office recruit / does the CO have the necessary technical resources to monitor the use and impact of the support	YES NO	1 5	1 3	1 15

¹¹ UNDP CO should always escalate the decision to headquarters in case of envisaged DIM projects engaging security forces

provided during all the programme cycle management phases (planning, managing, monitoring and evaluation). (This could include the presence or recruitment of a (Chief) Technical Advisor for programmatic support?)				
<i>Rationale</i>	<i>NO</i>	<i>The absence of technical staff to the project increases severely the probability of the reputational risk since the CO won't be able to assess, monitor and respond to risks in the project.</i>	<i>The absence of technical staff to the project increases substantially the impact of the reputational risk since the CO won't be able to assess, monitor and respond to risks in the project.</i>	
3. Is the country under any "state of emergency" and/or any form of international (UN or regional organization) sanction?	YES NO	2 1	5 1	10 1
<i>Rationale</i>		<i>The fact that a country is under any form of international sanction increases importantly the probability of the reputational risk. The existence of sanctions indicates the country situation is not respecting existing international commitments and standards. In such situations the Rule of Law may be at risk and there may be a greater risk of grave human rights violations</i>	<i>The fact that a country is under any form of international sanction and/or state of emergency increases importantly the impact of the reputational risk for UNDP. A country under any form of international sanction may seek to develop and / or maintain relationships with the United Nations for political reasons. In such contexts, United Nations and UNDP will be under deep scrutiny by the international community.</i> <i>The existence of a State of Emergency means that rights and freedoms may be suspended (all rights that</i>	

			<i>can be derogated are listed in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights). For example, a government can detain individuals and hold them without trial in certain limited circumstances. The absence of state of emergency does not mean absence of risk as empirical evidence has shown the state of emergency has now become so frequent, with notably legislation on terrorism, that it is essentially permanent in ERM countries.</i>	
4. Are there functioning national and civilian oversight mechanisms of the security (police/gendarmerie/defense) forces (UNDP CO should always escalate the decision to headquarters in case there is no civilian oversight / elected government)?	YES NO	1 2	1 5	1 10
<i>Definition</i>		- <i>“Functioning oversight mechanism” means that such mechanisms are not only existing in legislation/regulations but have an administrative existence with reports and other being produced for civilian authorities; (ii) where there is an alleged breach of criminal, civil or human rights law, individual or corporate responsibility can be investigated and determined in a transparent process consistent with human rights standards; (iii) ombudsperson or National Human Rights Institutions or National Preventive Mechanisms carry out investigations, issue recommendations and draft monitoring reports; etc.</i>		

<i>Rationale</i>		<p>- <i>Oversight includes internal (inspections, etc) and external (parliament, judiciary, etc) type of mechanisms</i></p> <p><i>The existence of functional national and civilian oversight mechanisms does not mean that there are no risks related to the security forces and consequently to UNDP support.</i></p> <p><i>The absence of a functional national and civilian oversight increases the probability of the reputational risk. The absence of functioning oversight structures opens the door to grave human rights violations to occur and multiply since security institutions are cut from civilian world with no civilian accountability framework.</i></p>	<p><i>The existence of functional national and civilian oversight mechanisms does not mean that there are no risks related to the security forces and consequently to UNDP support.</i></p> <p><i>The absence of functional national and civilian oversight mechanisms can have an important impact on the reputational risk of UNDP. In such situations, the security forces operate without a strong accountability framework to civilian authorities, leaving the door open for grave violations of human rights to occur in impunity (the absence of such a framework blurs the line between the gravity of human rights violations with a possible “no limits” perception). This is especially the case in countries without elected government or in political transition. In such situations, the chain of command may be even looser and the authority of civilian leaders (traditional UNDP interlocutors) on the security forces may be challenged or absent`.</i></p>	
5. Are national policies or ongoing processes to reform/support the security sector participatory, inclusive, non-discriminatory and people-centered?	YES NO	1 4	1 2	1 8
<i>Definition</i>		<i>Participatory, inclusive and people-centered means that support to the security sector should follow the human rights-based approach and support confidence-building measures between civil society (including women’s organizations) and the security</i>		

<p><i>Rationale</i></p>		<p><i>sector. In the case of the security sector, such approach should ensure that (i) civilians (including both men and women) are part of security sector reform process and production of national security policies and strategies and at the center of any type of support to the security sector; (ii) the reform of the security sector aims at providing improved security services to the population (taking into consideration the specific security needs of women and men), including to marginalized groups (including women, minorities, rural and urban populations, children, persons with disabilities, LGBTI minority populations etc); (iii) public outreach activities and public perception surveys are carried out; etc.</i></p> <p><i>The absence of participatory, inclusive, non-discriminatory and people-centered national policies/processes to reform the security sector is an indicator of a lack of understanding and possible interest from national authorities/relevant ministries of what SSR entails. It also indicates a weak civilian accountability framework. Such absence increases the probability of grave human rights violations to happen.</i></p>	<p><i>The existence of participatory, inclusive and people-centered national policies/processes to reform the security sector can have an important impact on the accountability framework. Their absence does not increase much the impact of the reputational risk since national policies/ongoing processes are unfortunately rarely participatory, inclusive and people-centered (baseline is low).</i></p>	
<p>Intended Recipients Situation</p>				
<p>6. Is/are the intended recipient(s) accused of grave human rights violations including any</p>	<p>YES NO</p>	<p>5 1</p>	<p>2 1</p>	<p>10 1</p>

specific record of violations? ¹²				
<i>Rationale</i>		<i>When the recipient(s) is/are accused of grave human rights violations including any specific record of violations, the probability of grave human rights violations is increased and the reputational risk for UNDP is severe. Such situation reflects a general lack of accountability within the security forces that open the doors to further grave human rights violations.</i>	<i>When the recipient(s) is/are accused of grave human rights violations including any specific record of violations, the impact on the reputational risk for UNDP is high. The overall country situation is usually understood by international partners as very challenging, including for UNDP. In such situations strong mitigation measures are extremely important though in order to demonstrate that UNDP works to change such situations.</i>	

¹² UNDP does not have a monitoring mandate in the area of human rights. Information on the record of the intended recipient with regard to compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law are made available by OHCHR and human rights components of PKO and SP missions and other reliable sources. UNDP CO may also consult existing human resources in the RCO such as Peace and Development Advisors (PDA) and Human Rights Advisors (HRA) – it is important to keep in mind that neither PDA nor HRA have a monitoring role though. Sources of information relating to human rights violations include:

- Reports produced by the Country Office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights or by the Human Rights Component of peacekeeping missions or special political missions as well as various types of reports of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council (HRC). These reports may be public or not.
- Reports of UN Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures
- Reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council on peacekeeping operations
- Reports of other UN mechanisms or agencies (Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on children and armed conflicts, Special Representatives on Children in Armed Conflicts and Sexual Violence in Conflict, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA)
- Reports of UN commissions of inquiry
- Decisions and reports of UN treaty bodies including on individual cases
- Reports from Joint Mission Analysis Cells in peacekeeping operations

Other sources include, but are not limited to:

International or regional organizations (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, European Union, African Union)

- Reports from National Human Rights Institutions such as commissions or ombudsman offices or National Preventive Mechanisms
- Reports from international non-governmental organizations (International Crisis Group, International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, etc.)
- Reports from local non-governmental organizations
- Information emanating from the intended recipient security forces¹² or governmental sources
- Media reports

		<i>Such element may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and is therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.</i>		
7. Is/are recipient(s) taking effective steps to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable?	YES NO	1 5	1 3	1 15
<i>Rationale</i>		<p><i>In those cases where the recipient(s) is taking effective steps to hold perpetrators accountable of any grave human rights violations, the risk is low but needs to be monitored. It is important to ensure those steps eventually bring results.</i></p> <p><i>When the recipient(s) does not take effective steps to hold perpetrators accountable of any grave human rights violations, the probability of the reputational risk for UNDP increases importantly. Such a situation means national partners are not able and/or willing to make the security forces accountable for their deeds. It also could mean that national partners may not pay attention to international stakeholders, including UNDP (weak leverage from international partners, including UNDP, on national partners to respond to such grave human rights violations).</i></p> <p><i>Such elements may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and are therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.</i></p>	<p><i>In those cases where the recipient(s) is taking effective steps to hold perpetrators accountable of any grave human rights violations, the impact on the reputational risk is low but needs to be monitored. It is important to ensure those steps bring results.</i></p> <p><i>When the recipient(s) does not take effective steps to hold perpetrators accountable of any grave human rights violations, the impact on the reputational risk is substantial. It opens the door for grave human rights violations to occur or remain unaddressed.</i></p>	

<p>8. Are corrective measures being taken or institutions, protocols or procedures put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations?</p>	<p>YES NO</p>	<p>/ 5</p>	<p>/ 3</p>	<p>YES – GO TO QUESTION 9 NO: 15 – GO TO QUESTION 10</p>
<p><i>Rationale</i></p>		<p><i>When the recipient(s) does not take corrective measures or institutions, protocols or procedures are not put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations, the probability of the reputational risk for UNDP increases. Such a situation means national partners are not able and/or willing to make the security forces accountable for their deeds. It also could mean that national partners may not pay attention to international stakeholders, including UNDP (weak leverage from international partners, including UNDP, on national partners to respond to such grave human rights violations).</i></p> <p><i>Such elements may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and are therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.</i></p>	<p><i>When the recipient(s) does not take corrective measures or institutions, protocols or procedures are not put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations, the probability of the reputational risk for UNDP is severe. Such a situation means national partners are not able and/or willing to make the security forces accountable for their actions in the medium and long-term. It also could mean that national partners may not pay attention to international stakeholders, including UNDP (weak leverage from international partners, including UNDP, on national partners to respond to such grave human rights violations).</i></p>	
<p>9. Are the corrective measures to hold any future perpetrators accountable adequate?</p>	<p>YES NO</p>	<p>1 5</p>	<p>1 3</p>	<p>1 15</p>
<p><i>Definition</i></p>		<p><i>“Adequate” means that the corrective measures enable the prevention of a recurrence of such violations.</i></p>		
<p><i>Rationale</i></p>				

		<p><i>In those cases where corrective measures are been taken or institutions, protocols or procedures are put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations, the probability of the reputational risk is low but need to be monitored. It is important to ensure those steps bring results.</i></p> <p><i>In a situation where corrective measures to hold any future perpetrators accountable are not adequate, the probability of renewed violations is high since existing measures/mechanisms are not efficient. Such inefficiency may also indicate weak capacity and/or insufficient willingness of national partners to avoid such violations to occur.</i></p> <p><i>Such element may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and is therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.</i></p>	<p><i>In those cases where corrective measures are been taken or institutions, protocols or procedures put in place with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations, the probability of the reputational risk is low but need to be monitored. It is important to ensure those steps bring eventually results.</i></p> <p><i>In a situation where corrective measures to hold any future perpetrators accountable are not adequate, the impact of renewed violations on UNDP reputational risk is substantial since existing measures/mechanisms are not efficient. Such inefficiency may also indicate weak capacity and/or insufficient willingness of national partners to avoid such violations to occur.</i></p>	
Security Forces Situation				
10. Are security forces engaged in armed conflicts (currently or have they been within the last year)?	YES NO	5 1	3 1	15 1
<i>Rationale</i>		<p><i>In a situation where security forces an active part in armed conflicts, the probability of renewed violations is severe. In crisis-affected situations the rule of law is profoundly undermined, and injustice and insecurity are allowed to flourish. When security forces play an active part in an armed conflict, internal and external</i></p>	<p><i>In countries where security forces play an active part in armed conflicts, there is an understanding that operating in such contexts is challenging for the United Nations and that any support from UNDP aims precisely to improve the governance of the security sector.</i></p>	

		<i>accountability mechanisms are not properly functioning while civilian oversight is undermined. In countries immersed in armed conflict, the population, and especially marginalized groups such as women and children are more likely to be subjected to grave human rights violations.</i>		
11. Do security forces commit (or have they committed within the last year) grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law?	YES NO	5 1	3 1	15 1
<i>Rationale</i>		<i>In a situation where security forces play an active part in grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law the probability of renewed violations is severe.</i> <i>Such element may likely lead quickly to further grave human rights violations and is therefore increasing highly the probability of such violations.</i>	<i>In a situation where security forces play an active part in grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law the probability of renewed violations is substantial.</i>	
12. Can UNDP be accused of enabling military/security operations or indirectly supporting grave human rights violations against the civilian population or neighboring countries?	YES NO	5 1	5 1	25 1
<i>Rationale</i>		<i>In a situation where UNDP can be accused of enabling military/security operations or</i>	<i>In a situation where UNDP can be accused of enabling military/security operations or indirectly supporting or</i>	

		<i>indirectly supporting or enhancing violent actions against the civilian population or neighboring countries the probability of UNDP to be affected is severe.</i>	<i>enhancing violent actions against the civilian population or neighboring countries the impact on the reputational risk of UNDP is severe.</i>	
Reputational Risk				
Points	Level of Risk	Level of Risk – Detailed Threshold		
25-48	Not likely to Moderately likely	Not likely	25	
		Moderately likely	26-48	
49-104	Likely			
105-154	Highly Likely to Expected	Highly Likely	105-125	
		Expected	126-154	

<i>Definition of the likelihood scale</i>	
<i>Level</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>Not Likely</i>
<i>2</i>	<i>Moderately Likely</i>
<i>3</i>	<i>Likely</i>
<i>4</i>	<i>Highly Likely</i>
<i>5</i>	<i>Expected</i>

Definition of Reputational Risks from the HRDDP perspective *[this information must be visible to the reader]*:

Highly likely to Expected: Country where there is a high risk of grave violations of human rights; the Rule of Law institutions are not covering the entire territory and/or needs of the population and/or are dysfunctional; where the chain of command is non-existent or dysfunctional; where functional civilian oversight structures and mechanisms are not in place yet.

Likely: Country where there is a medium risk of grave violations of human rights; the Rule of Law institutions are not fully functional yet; where the chain of command is disrupted or not functional; where civilian oversight structures and mechanisms are in place but not functional.

Not likely to Moderately Likely: Country where limited grave violations of human rights occur; where the Rule of Law institutions are functional and responsive in the case of grave human rights violations; where the chain of command of security forces is functional and corrective measures taken and implemented; where civilian oversight is functional.

Possible Mitigation Measures to the Reputational Risk:

[This window must appear at the end of the questionnaire and not during the questionnaire]

In order to mitigate the risks factors identified, the CO needs to adopt mitigation measures. Mitigation measures can be twofold: preventive and/or corrective measures. Emphasis should be put on preventive measures since corrective measures may have limited impact on the reduction of risks. A list of preventive and corrective measures are indicated below by cluster. Please click on each cluster to see the detailed measures. Suspension/withdrawal of support puts at risk UN peacebuilding and development measures in the country. In such cases, suspension of support may be considered for its deterrent effect above all with efforts put on sensitization and prevention.¹³

For mitigation to be effective, measures related to intended recipients' situation and security forces situation should include at least 2 elements of category (A) and one of categories (B) and (C).

Preventive measures

- A. Institutional reforms type of programmatic support aimed at improving the democratic governance of the security sector

Definition: reforms that relates to the legal and institutional framework (mission of security forces; status of security personal; etc); to the institutional management, i.e. the capacities of central command to manage security forces (human resources; internal control; strategic planning; financial planning; etc); but also to democratic oversight. Such reforms should be participatory, non-discriminatory and inclusive in order to ensure civilians are part of security sector reform process and the production of national security policies and strategies; and contribute ultimately to improve confidence between civil society and the security sector.

Stand-alone training-type of activities, sensitization activities and provision of equipment/rehabilitation of infrastructures are not sufficient per se and cannot be considered as mitigation measures.

Ensure support addresses reform of the institutional framework (legal framework; mission of security forces; status of security personnel; etc) and captures accountability issues of security forces of such framework;

1. Support addresses institutional reforms that improves the accountability of security institutions – i.e. revising the legal and institutional framework that improves the accountability of security forces, improving the capacities of central command to manage security forces (human resources management; trainings architecture; strategic planning; financial planning; etc (A);

¹³ Support to be suspended does not include “training or sensitization regarding international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law; standard-setting and capacity support directly related to the implementation and promotion of compliance with human rights laws and standards and to foster democratic governance of security institutions; engagement to promote compliance with humanitarian, human rights and refugee law or to negotiate humanitarian access and carry out relief operations; mediation and mediation-related support; MEDEVAC and CASEVAC”. Cf. Decision No. 2011/18 – Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, §9

2. Programmatic support to strengthen civilian stakeholders and/or external oversight capacities on the security sector is developed (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finances, Audit Court, Parliament, Civil society, National Human Rights Institution, Media, etc) (A)
3. Internal control mechanisms are strengthened (inspection bodies, etc) (A);
4. The production of protocols, procedures and any other relevant tools that strengthen internal accountability mechanisms is supported (A).

B. Provision of security services to the population and/or inclusion of protection of victims and witnesses activities

Definition: support to the security sector should follow the human-rights-based-approach and contribute to improved confidence and accountability between the civilian population and the security sector. Such an approach should ensure the reform of the security sector aims at providing improved security services to the population (taking into consideration specific security needs of women and men), including to marginalized groups (including women, minorities, rural and urban populations, children, persons with disabilities, LGBTI minority populations etc). Services could include, for example, setting up an operational “green line” where populations can call security forces and receive support in a responsive manner; centers that provide specialized support for youth, IDPs, refugees, women victims of violence and children; community security and arms violence reduction type of activities that do not involve support to security forces per se; cooperation with CSOs including women’s organizations, victim support measures within access to justice programmes; public outreach activities, including public perception surveys; etc.

1. Outreach activities, provision of services to the population (community policing; etc) and protection type of activities are supported (shelters for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) victims; etc) (B);
2. Judiciary accountability mechanisms are supported (military/civilian justice institutions) (B);
3. Inclusive and participatory processes are supported, by engaging as a priority with marginalized populations and also civil society (including women’s organizations), interim legislative bodies, relevant line ministries, local governance bodies, the justice sector and the media in the security sector reform and production of national security policies and strategies (B);
4. Public outreach activities and public perception surveys are developed (B).

C. Operational measures strengthening technical capacity of UNDP to implement the project and ensure the quality assurance of it.

Definition: Such measures entail ensuring the CO has at its disposal the necessary technical resources to monitor the use and impact of support. This may involve recruitment and / or effective deployment of technical staff, such as Chief Technical Advisors, National Technical Advisors and any additional relevant technical staff

1. The necessary technical resources exist to monitor the use and impact of support whether international and /or national. Strong gender expertise should be available within the team (C);
2. A mapping of the security sector and do a human rights-based analysis and a stakeholders’ analysis in order to be aware of security sector stakeholders’ rights, interests, strengths and weaknesses and the capacity of the security sector to meet their obligations and to capture

- power relations is clear. This should then provide a roadmap for the capacity development support required both for stakeholders and the security sector (separate or as part of existing tools; for example, within the Conflict and Development Analysis) (C);
3. An analysis of the origins of failure to hold future perpetrators accountable and develop programmatic measures accordingly is produced (C);

Corrective Measures: UNDP should assess the degree to which providing or withholding support would affect the UN's ability to influence the behavior of the receiving entity in terms of its compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. The CO may consider whether (i) suspension/withdrawal of support puts at risk UN engagement in the sector; (ii) suspension/withdrawal of support puts at risk UN peacebuilding measures in the country.¹⁴

1. Request appropriate authorities through official correspondence to take effective steps with a view to putting an end to grave violations of one or other of those bodies of law mentioned in the HRDDP (Corrective);
2. Limit support through an official correspondence to the departments of the institution that do not have staff accused of grave human rights violations (Corrective).
3. Suspend temporarily part of the programme through an official correspondence (Corrective);
4. Withhold support to the sector at large through an official correspondence. This measure is a last-resort measure that should be considered for its deterrent effect (Corrective/Preventive).¹⁵

¹⁴ Cf. Paragraph 28

¹⁵ There may be a preventive effect in the early communication to national partners of this measure

Insertion of Mitigatory Measures:

Please, indicate mitigatory measures for every risk factor and precise whether the measure is planned or implemented. For mitigation to be effective, measures related to intended recipients' situation and security forces situation should include at least 2 elements of category (A) and one of categories (B) and (C).

Risk Factor	Mitigatory Measure	Planned	Implemented	Number of Points gathered by the Mitigatory Measure	Total of Points per Risk Factor
1		YES/NO	YES/NO		
2		YES/NO	YES/NO		
3		YES/NO	YES/NO		
4		YES/NO	YES/NO		
5		YES/NO	YES/NO		
6		YES/NO	YES/NO		
7		YES/NO	YES/NO		
8		YES/NO	YES/NO		
9		YES/NO	YES/NO		
10		YES/NO	YES/NO		
11		YES/NO	YES/NO		
12		YES/NO	YES/NO		
TOTAL					

Mitigatory Measures Calculation Table

Please, upload / include the project document and any other relevant programmatic document as supporting documents.

Mitigatory Measures		Number of points per risk factor													
	Risk Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12		Total
A															
A.1	<i>[NEED TO HAVE THE QUESTION HERE AS A POP UP WINDOW]</i>	X	X	1	X	X	2	2	2	4	3	4	X		18
A.2		X	X	X	2	X	2	2	2	3	3	2	X		16
A.3		X	X	X	1	X	2	2	2	1	X	X	X		8
A.4		X	X	X	1	X	X	2	2	1	X	X	X		6
B															
B.1		X	X	X	X	2	X	X	X	X	4	2	X		8
B.2		X	X	X	1	X	X	X	X	3	X	4	X		8
B.3		X	X	X	1	2	X	X	X	X	2	1	X		6
B.4		X	X	X	1	2	X	X	X	X	2	1	X		6
C															
C.1		X	5	5	1	X	2	5	5	5	5	5	5		43
C.2		X	X	1	X	X	1	1	X	X	X	X	X		3
C.3		X	X	1	X	X	X	X	2	1	X	X	X		4
Corrective 1									5	5	5	5	5		5
Corrective 2														5	5
Corrective 3														5	5
Corrective 4														5	5
A+B			0	1	7	6	6	7	8	12	14	14	0		75
A+B+C			5	8	8	6	9	14	15	18	19	19	5		126

Risk	Mitigatory Measure	Number of points	Justification
1	X	X	
2	C.1	5	<i>The existence of a project/programme to support the security sector in countries where UNDP operate carries an intrinsic risk that can be properly managed only with the presence of a Chief Technical Advisor in the Country Office.</i>
3	A.1	1	<i>The existence of international sanctions increases requires a solid analysis of the political dimension of the support to the security sector, including a human rights and a stakeholders' analysis of the sector; it also requires a good planning of the support to the sector. Such work can be done only with the necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support.</i>
	C.1	5	
	C.2	1	
	C.3	1	
4	A.2	2	<i>In a country where oversight mechanisms of the security sector are not functioning, priority should go to reinforce both the internal and external control mechanisms. The presence of a the necessary technical resources to monitor the use and impact of support is required.</i>
	A.3	1	
	A.4	1	
	B.2	1	
	B.3	1	
	B.4	1	
	C.1	1	
5	B.1	2	<i>In order to have national policies and SSR to be participatory, inclusive processes and people-centered, specific measures enabling to flag such needs (perception surveys, etc) and activities to make such participation happen are necessary.</i>
	B.3	2	
	B.4	2	
6	A.1	2	<i>When members of the security forces are accused of grave human rights violations, programmatic support should target institutional reforms of the security institutions, in order to get systemic changes; but also external oversight institutions to ensure that such violations are being identified and responded to at the national level. Any work on SOP and internal procedures should be linked to institutional reforms; otherwise it is useless and should not be undertaken. A human rights-based analysis should be undertaken with the support of the necessary technical resources in order for UNDP to have its own assessment of the situation and be able to respond to it programmatically. Gender related concerns should be the integral part of this analysis.</i>
	A.2	2	
	A.3	2	
	C.1	2	
	C.2	1	
7	A.1	2	<i>When members of the security forces are accused of grave human rights violations, programmatic support should target institutional reforms of the security institutions, in order to get systemic changes; but also external oversight institutions to ensure that such violations are being identified and responded to at the national level. In addition to this</i>
	A.2	2	

	A.3	2	<p><i>work, there is also a need to support specific SOP and internal procedures enabling institutions to respond to cases of grave human rights violations committed by the security forces through internal disciplinary mechanisms. Such work can take place with the necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support.</i></p> <p><i>In such a situation, an official communication by the CO to the security institutions could be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable (corrective)</i></p>
	A.4	2	
	C.1	5	
	C.2	1	
	Corrective 1	5	
8	A.1	2	<p><i>When members of the security forces are accused of grave human rights violations, programmatic support should target institutional reforms of the security institutions, in order to get systemic changes; but also external oversight institutions to ensure that such violations are being identified and responded to at the national level. In addition to this work, there is also a need to support specific SOP and internal procedures enabling institutions to respond to cases of grave human rights violations committed by the security forces through internal disciplinary mechanisms. An analysis of the origins of failure to hold future perpetrators accountable should be produced and programmatic response designed accordingly. Such work can take place only with the necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support..</i></p> <p><i>In such situations, an official communication by the CO to the security institutions could be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable (corrective)</i></p>
	A.2	2	
	A.3	2	
	A.4	2	
	C.1	5	
	C.3	2	
	Corrective 1	5	
9	A.1	2	<p><i>When members of the security forces are accused of grave human rights violations, programmatic support should target institutional reforms of the security institutions, in order to get systemic changes; but also external oversight institutions to ensure that such violations are being identified and responded to at the national level. In addition to this work, there is also a need to support specific SOP and internal procedures enabling institutions to respond to cases of graves human rights violations committed by the security forces through internal disciplinary mechanisms. An analysis of the origins of failure to hold future perpetrators accountable should be produced and programmatic response designed accordingly. Such work can take place only with the necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support.</i></p>
	A.2	2	
	A.3	2	
	A.4	2	
	B.2	3	

	C.1	5	<i>Measures to support the judiciary to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of grave human rights violations by security forces should be taken.</i>
	C.3	2	
	Corrective 1	5	
10	A.1	2	<i>In a country where security forces are engaged in armed conflicts, UNDP should engage only in reforms that seek to improve the accountability of security institutions and strengthen civilian control over those institutions. Likewise, UNDP should develop a programmatic engagement that engages heavily with the population and support to the populations' protection needs. Such work can take place only with the necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support.</i>
	A.2	2	
	B.1	2	
	B.3	2	
	B.4	2	<i>In such situation: (i) an official communication by the CO to the security institutions should be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable; (ii) UNDP could limit its support through an official correspondence to the departments of the institution that do not have staff accused of grave human rights violations</i>
	C.1	5	
	Corrective 1	5	
11	A.1	2	<i>In a country where security forces are engaged in armed conflicts, UNDP should engage only in reforms that seek to improve the accountability of security institutions and strengthen civilian control over those institutions. Likewise, UNDP should develop a programmatic engagement that engages heavily with the population and support to the population protection needs, ensuring that both women's and men's security needs are taken into account. Such work can take place only with the necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support.</i>
	A.2	2	
	B.1	2	
	B.2		
	B.3	2	
	B.4	2	<i>In such situation: (i) an official communication by the CO to the security institutions should be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable; (ii) UNDP could limit its support through an official correspondence to the departments of the institution that do not have staff accused of grave human rights violations (corrective)</i>
	Corrective 1	5	
12	C.1	5	<i>In a situation where UNDP can be accused of enabling military/security operations or indirectly supporting grave human rights violations against the civilian population or neighboring countries, the Country Office needs to have a Chief Technical Advisor able to</i>
	Corrective 1	5	

	Corrective 2	5	<i>advise the senior management of the country office. No programmatic support can mitigate such a situation that must be addressed at political level with the support of the CTA.</i>
	Corrective 3	5	
	Corrective 4	5	

In such a situation: (i) an official communication by the CO to the security institutions should be made to request them to take necessary action to hold perpetrators of any such violations accountable; (ii) UNDP should suspend its support to the security sector at large through an official correspondence (corrective).

Maximum number of points for every mitigatory measure	5
Maximum number of points when all mitigatory measures are in place	112
Maximum number of points for mitigatory measures initiated but not yet fully in place	25% of the points (including if the <i>necessary technical resources required to monitor the use and impact of support are in place / officially / or in the process of being recruited but not yet deployed</i>)

Points	Level of Risk	Level of Risk – Detailed Threshold	
25-48	Not likely to Moderately likely	Not likely	25
		Moderately likely	26-48
49-104	Likely		
105-154	Highly Likely to Expected	Highly Likely	105-125
		Expected	126-154

Example CAR	Total of Points	Total of Point of Mitigatory Measures	Total of Point after Mitigatory measures
Country Situation July 2013	153	0	148
Country Situation July 2014	128	26	102
Country Situation April 2015	106	58	48
Country Situation January 2017	97	58	39

Definition of Reputational Risk after Mitigatory Measures have been applied *[this information must be visible to the reader]*:

Highly likely to Expected: Country where there is a high risk of grave violations of human rights and where UNDP has limited technical and programmatic resources in place in country to assess and address those risks.

Likely: Country where there is a high or medium risk of grave violations of human rights; but where UNDP has acquired substantial technical resources that enable the organization to regularly assess the risks and respond to them through a solid programmatic approach and political dialogue.

Not likely to Moderately Likely: Country where there is a high or medium risk of grave violations of human rights or limited occurrence of grave human rights violations; and where UNDP has acquired substantial technical resources that enable the organization to regularly assess the risks and respond to them through a solid programmatic approach and political dialogue.

Country Profile:

Highly likely to Expected Risks:

At CO Level:

- Commitment to the project or programme cannot be given by the CO and UNDP must not engage in the provision of support to the intended recipient.¹⁶
- The RR shall in such cases escalate the risk to the Regional Bureau, through the ERM system. In addition to escalating the risk on the system, the Country Office shall initiate discussions with the Regional Bureau to ensure a timely response.
- Project or programme activities, including procurement of goods and services, shall not be initiated before the criteria review and risk assessment are cleared by the RR and relevant HQ units as needed
- Factors of risk to consider for decision-making and mitigations measures need to be reviewed and submitted in the ERM system.

At HQ Level:

- The Regional Bureau shall, in consultation with the Crisis Bureau, review the risk assessment. The Bureau's assessment considers the risk assessment and risk mitigation strategy together with the planned benefits (objectives) of the project or programme at the country level.
- The Regional Bureau then takes one of the following decisions: a) concludes that the risk is acceptable and approves UNDP's involvement, b) concludes that the risk is not acceptable and denies UNDP's involvement or c) further escalates the risk to the Associate Administrator who will make a decision on whether to approve or deny UNDP's involvement. The Associate Administrator may decide to consult with the members of the ERM Committee prior to taking a decision.
- The Regional Bureau informs the Country Office of the decision.
 - o In case of a positive decision, agreements can be signed and project or programme activities including procurement of goods and services can be started.
 - o In case of a negative decision, the CO will be asked to revise the project or programme so that the criteria are met, after which the same process starts again.
- The risk assessment underpinning the approval to proceed with the project or programme will be part of the submission to the ACP in case of large scale procurement exceeding the delegated authority of the CO.

Highly likely to Expected Risks after Mitigation Measures: Where UNDP concludes that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the intended recipient committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, notwithstanding any mitigatory

¹⁶ Cf. Decision No. 2011/18 – Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, § 16

*measures that the United Nations might take, then UNDP must not engage in the provision of support to that intended recipient.*¹⁷

Likely Risk:

At CO Level:

- Commitment to the project or programme cannot be given by the CO and UNDP must not engage in the provision of support to the intended recipient.¹⁸
- The RR shall in such cases escalate the risk to the Regional Bureau, through the ERM system. In addition to escalating the risk on the system, the Country Office shall initiate discussions with the Regional Bureau to ensure a timely response.
- Project or programme activities, including procurement of goods and services, shall not be initiated before the criteria review and risk assessment are cleared by the RR and relevant HQ units as needed
- Factors of risk to consider for decision-making and mitigations measures need to be reviewed and submitted in the ERM system.

At HQ Level:

- The Regional Bureau shall, in consultation with Crisis Bureau, review the criteria and risk assessment form provided in the annex, in those cases where UNDP's programmatic involvement in projects or programmes dealing with security sector is escalated to HQ. The Bureau's assessment considers the risk assessment and risk mitigation strategy together with the planned benefits (objectives) of the project or programme at the country level.
- The Regional Bureau then takes one of the following decisions: a) concludes that the risk is acceptable and approves UNDP's involvement, b) concludes that the risk is not acceptable and denies UNDP's involvement or c) further escalates the risk to the Associate Administrator who will make a decision on whether to approve or deny UNDP's involvement. The Associate Administrator may decide to consult with the members of the ERM Committee prior to taking a decision.
- The Regional Bureau informs the Country Office of the decision.
 - o In case of a positive decision, agreements can be signed and project or programme activities including procurement of goods and services can be started.
 - o In case of a negative decision, the CO will be asked to revise the project or programme so that the criteria are met, after which the same process starts again.
- The risk assessment underpinning the approval to proceed with the project or programme will be part of the submission to the ACP in case of large scale procurement exceeding the delegated authority of the CO.

Likely Risk after Mitigation Measures: *Where UNDP concludes that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the intended recipient committing grave violations of international*

¹⁷ Cf. Decision No. 2011/18 – Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, § 16

¹⁸ Cf. Decision No. 2011/18 – Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, § 16

humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, notwithstanding any mitigatory measures that the United Nations might take, then UNDP must not engage in the provision of support to that intended recipient.

Not Likely to Moderately likely Risk: Factors of risk to consider for decision-making and mitigations measures need to be reviewed and submitted in the ERM system.

15. Procedures for communication with the relevant authorities:

It is recommended to explain to national partners the UN normative framework and specifically the policy prior to any engagement to the sector.¹⁹ This is important since the policy should be considered first of all for its preventive dimension with communication procedures designed accordingly. Those procedures should be set out by Country Offices on an *ad hoc* manner and be embedded in the larger political dialogue.

- Prior to any engagement:

The legal obligations of the UN, and specifically the normative framework for engagement to the sector, should be communicated to the relevant authorities (host government, line-ministries and concerned entity at technical level); According to the Policy “the responsible senior UN official [s] (e.g. SRSG, Resident Coordinator) should inform in writing the recipient authority/ies of the UN’s core principles for support to non-UN security forces under this policy. In particular, recipients should be notified that UN support cannot be provided to units that fall under the command of individuals against whom there are substantiated allegations of grave violations of international, human rights or refugee law. The recipient authority should also be advised of procedures or mechanisms to implement the HRDDP [...]. It should be made clear to the recipient that, in order to sustain the support, the UN is obligated to continuously assess whether or not the recipient’s actions are consistent with the Organization’s obligations under the relevant bodies of law”.²⁰

Responsible senior UN official(s)	
In mission countries	SRSG
In non-integrated mission countries	SRSG and RC
In UNCT countries	RC

Important: while advocacy and communication may be undertaken by a specific UN entity, the Policy recommends coordination and consistency across the UN in-country. Besides, the most Senior United Nations official should be kept informed of such steps.²¹

¹⁹ Cf. Decision No. 2011/18 – Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, §18

²⁰ Cf. Decision No. 2011/18 – Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, § 19

²¹ Cf. Decision No. 2011/18 – Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, § 19

- During the engagement and in case grave violations are committed by bodies of law:
Reporting of grave violations may be communicated to UN entities with a monitoring and/or political mandate. Communication to national authorities of management responses should be made on a case-by-case basis.

16. Procedures for monitoring and reporting:

- Existing UNDP monitoring and reporting architecture should be used to report on the risks, problems and managements response taken prior to and during the implementation of the support;
- Relevant information on HRDDP implementation should be included into appropriate UNDP reports;
- Experience on implementing the policy should be included in reports when relevant and shared with relevant UN entities.

In the case of integrated missions, Mission-UNCT consultations should be part of established procedure

17. Applicability

The guidelines are prescriptive when CO consider engaging with security forces in all country situations, whether post-conflict or regular development situations. The Enterprise Risk Management system (ERM) should be used as a way of documenting the analysis by the RR behind the decision making process.

These guidelines apply to:

- All projects or programmes implemented by UNDP in any country setting, including joint programmes and programmes administered through trusts funds and the Peacebuilding Fund.
- All projects or programmes administered / managed at the country level with no specific programmatic UNDP involvement (for instance through country based MDTFs).

These guidelines do not apply if:

- UNDP is only involved administratively at headquarters. In those situations, the office administering the fund (MDTFO) informs the Associate Administrator of UNDP's administrative involvement, through the Regional Bureau and Crisis Bureau if applicable, before funds are transferred to the implementing agency(ies).

18. Annexes

HRDDP Guidance Documents Produced by the Review Group:

- Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP)
- HRDDP Summary
- Core messages for interaction between UN system officials and Government interlocutors
- “If asked” guidance for UN officials to complement core messages

HRDDP UNDP Guidance Documents:

- HRDDP Implementation Framework – Risk Matrix Methodology

Guidelines and Tools to support the Security Sector:

- *Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United Nations in supporting Security Sector Reform*, Report of the Secretary General, A/62/659–S/2008/39, (2008)
- *Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance* (2008)
- *Concept Note, Supporting Democratic Governance of Security Institutions*, UNDP (2010)
- *Democratic Governance of the Security Sector*, IASSRTF (2011)
- *UNDP and Security Sector Reform (DRAFT)*, UNDP (2011)
- *UN Inter-agency SSR Task Force, Integrated Technical Guidance Notes* (2011) **Guidelines for Gender Sensitive Policing with a focus on Recruitment, Selection and Professional Development of Women in Police Services**, SEESAC (2012) <http://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Gender-and-Security/GUIDELINES-FOR-GENDER-SENSITIVE-POLICING-EN.pdf>
- **Gender Training Manual**, SEESAC, 2016 http://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Gender-and-Security/Gender-Training-Manual-for-the-Ministry-of-Defence-of-Ser_1.pdf
- **A Practical Tool for Integrating the Gender Perspective in Small Arms and Light Weapons legislative frameworks**, SEESAC, 2016 http://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Gender-and-Security/Gender_and_SALW_Toolkit_eng.pdf

Guidelines and Tools for Risk Management:

- Enterprise Risk Management
- Risk Assessment (POPP)
 - o <https://intranet.undp.org/global/documents/rma/Guidance%20for%20decision-making%20in%20regards%20to%20risks.doc>
 - o <https://intranet.undp.org/global/popp/rma/Pages/enterprise-risk-management-cycle.aspx>
 - o http://content.undp.org/go/prescriptive/Enterprise-Risk-Management-Documents/download/?d_id=1495240